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I. Introduction
In 2004, Earthlink Inc., a large internet service provider, and
Webroot Systems Inc., a software security company, performed a
spyware audit of personal computers (PCs) connected to the
Internet.1 Scanning approximately 4.6 million PCs, the audit detected
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2006; B.S. in
Earth Science, Minor Emphasis in Computer Science, University of California at Santa
Cruz, 1999. The author would like to thank Professors Margreth Barrett and Ashutosh
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would also like to thank his parents and brothers for their continued support. The author
would lastly like to thank Sarah Miguel for her support throughout this project and the
author's legal studies.
1. Earthlink Spy Audit, at http://www.earthlink.net/spyaudit/press/. See also
Earthlink and Webroot Release Second Spy Audit Report, at
http://www.earthlink.net/about/press/pr-spyAuditReport/.
approximately 116.5 million potential instances of spyware, an
average of about 25 per computer.2 The study's results also
confirmed a marked growth in the use of spyware programs in 2004,
showing a 114% increase in the presence of Trojan programs, and a
230% increase in spyware monitoring programs These staggering
statistics suggest the breadth of this new internet security epidemic,
and demonstrate how susceptible average computer users are to its
effects.
One of the main difficulties with spyware is accurately defining
which types of software spyware includes. Spyware serves as an
umbrella term for adware, trojan programs, stealware, various system
monitoring programs, and cookies.5 Although each type of spyware
may cause different specific problems, all variants pose serious threats
to computer privacy and performance.6 Effects of spyware programs
can vary from mere trivial annoyance, such as continual pop-up
advertisements directed at the user, to significant damage, such as
theft of personal banking passwords.7
In response to this growing epidemic, state and federal
legislatures have begun drafting and enacting legislation to curb the
use of spyware.8 Utah enacted the Spyware Control Act in 2004, and
California followed soon after with the Consumer Protection Against
2. Earthlink Spy Audit at http://www.earthlink.net/spyauditlpress/.
3. John E. Dunn, Study Finds Rise in Malicious Spyware (Feb. 7, 2005), at
http://www.computerworld.co.nz/news.nsf/O/56376E92B7CDA2A3CC256F9EOO6ACB8E?
OpenDocument&pub=Computerworld.
4. See John Borland, States Join Spyware Battle (Mar. 4, 2004), at
http://news.com.com/2100-1024-5170263.html?part=dht&tag=ntop ("'Spyware' and
'adware' are rarely clearly defined, but typically denote software that tracks computer
users' actions online"); Sharon Weinbar, The Spyware Inferno (Aug. 13, 2004) at
http://news.com.com/2010-1032-5307831.html ("While 1999 marks the beginning of the
modern usage of the word, there is vast disagreement on what 'spyware' means.").;
discussion infra "What is Spyware?".
5. Earthlink Spy Audit, at http://www.earthlink.net/spyaudit/press/.
6. See Aladdin Systems, The Spyware Epidemic: Dealing with "Legal" Malicious
Code (2004), at 4, at ftp://ftp.ealaddin.com/pub/marketing/eSafe/White-paper/
WP spyware/esafe spywarewp.pdf (in addition to annoying pop-ups, spyware may
perform a number of more insidious acts).
7. See Lisa Napoli, The Kinko's Caper: Burglary by Modem, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7,
2000, at C1, available at http://tech2.nytimes.com/mem/technology/
techreview.html?res=9EOCE1DD173F934A3575BCOA9659C8B63 (keystroke logging
spyware program used to steal 450 banking passwords off of a Kinko's internet terminal).
8. See, e.g., Spyware Control Act, Utah Annotated Code § 13-40-101 (Supp. 2004);
Consumer Protection Against Spyware Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22947 (West Supp.
2005). See also Benjamin Edelman, State Anti-Spyware Legislation, at
http://www.benedelman.org/spyware/legislation/.
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Spyware Act that same year.9 Congress has also been considering
anti-spyware legislation for several years.'0 However, legislating
against spyware has proven to be problematic, in large part stemming
from the poor understanding of what spyware includes.1' Due in part
to this confusion, anti-spyware laws have faced criticism from many
different groups representing various different interests. Software
industry groups have criticized the laws as being overinclusive,
potentially implicating legitimate commercial software applications; 2
adware companies have questioned the constitutionality of these
laws, challenging them on interstate commerce and free speech
grounds; 3 privacy groups have claimed the laws aren't stringent
enough, in essence condoning certain types of software that they feel
should be illegal.'
This note analyzes state anti-spyware legislation, as well as the
latest federal anti-spyware bill, 5 considering criticism raised and
evaluating their potential to be effective in stopping spyware.
Ultimately, this note concludes that these laws are best aimed at
regulating the use of adware, the allegedly more legitimate
commercial type of spyware, but do little to protect users from more
malicious types of spyware authored by hackers and cyber criminals.
Although federal laws addressing this type of malicious spyware
authoring exist, the challenges facing law enforcement in dealing
9. Spyware Control Act, Utah Annotated Code § 13-40-101 (Supp. 2004).
Consumer Protection Against Spyware Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22947 (West Supp.
2005).
10. See, e.g., Controlling Invasive and Unauthorized Software Act ,S.2131, 108th
Cong. (2004); Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act, H.R. 2929, 108th
Cong. (2004); Software Principles Yielding Better Levels of Consumer Knowledge Act, S.
2145, 108th Cong. (2004); Spyware Control and Privacy Protection Act, S.3180, 106th
Cong. (2000).
11. See Federal Trade Commission, Monitoring Software on Your PC: Spyware,
Adware, and Other Software, at 15-35, available at
http://www.ftc.govlbcp/workshops/spyware/transcript.pdf (discussing the difficulties of
accurately defining spyware, and the problems this poses for creating effective legislation).
12. See John Borland, States Join Spyware Battle (Mar. 4, 2004), at
http://news.com.com/2100-1024-5170263.html?part=dht&tag=ntop (Internet Alliance, an
association of technology companies, expressed concern that state anti-spyware laws may
"hamper some means of doing legitimate business on the net").
13. Pamela Parker & Janis Mara, When U Wins Injunction Against Utah Spyware Law
(Jun. 23, 2004), at http://www.clickz.com/news/article.php/3372291.
14. Susan Kuchinskas, Calif. Spyware Bill: "Worse Than Nothing" (Sept. 16, 2004), at
http://www.internetnews.com/security/article.php/3409281.
15. Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act, H.R. 29, 109th Cong.
(2005).
16. See Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000 & Supp. II 2002);
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2701 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
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with cyber crime detract from their effectiveness.17 The international
scope of the spyware problem also significantly complicates catching
and prosecuting spyware authors. 8  In addition to bolstering
enforcement of cyber-crime laws, this note concludes that the federal
government needs to regulate the software industry to ensure that a
competitive market for technological solutions to these security
problems exists. Only by coupling law enforcement with effective
industry regulation can the federal government successfully protect
computer users from the dangers of spyware.
II. Defining the Problem
A. What is Spyware?
The term spyware is generally used to describe any computer
program that gathers information about a user or an organization
without their consent.' 9  Spyware encompasses many forms of
software also referred to as adware, stealware, and malware. °
Adware is a specific type of spyware that uses information about an
individual's computer usage habits to target advertising to the user.21
Adware applications may also change settings in a user's web
browser, add websites to a user's favorites list, and track the websites
that a user visits.22 Although adware may be obnoxious and annoying,
it is considered by some to be a more benign form of spyware that
serves legitimate commercial, rather than criminal, ends. Adware is
arguably a legitimate business model, through which software
vendors are able to remove licensing fees for their software in return
for being allowed to target advertising to the user.23 A large industry
17. See Bob Tedeschi, E-commerce Report; Crime is Soaring in Cyberspace, but Many
Companies Keep it Quiet, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2003, at C4 (citing the ever expanding
number of cybercriminals, their use of anonymity software tools, and their superior
technical abilities as serious problems for law enforcement); Ryan Naraine, FBI's Cyber-
Crime Chief Relates Struggle for Top Talent (Nov. 30 2004), at
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,1733838,00.asp (discussing the FBI's inability to
retain top IT talent as being a major problem).
18. See Sebastian Rupley, Fighting Cybercrime (Jan. 28, 2003), at
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,1759,1655705,00.asp (citing McConnel report showing
that "only 9 of 52 countries analyzed have extended criminal laws to cyberspace.").
19. MICHAEL ERBSCHLOE, TROJANS, WORMS, AND SPYWARE: A COMPUTER
SECURITY PROFESSIONALS GUIDE TO MALICIOUS CODE 24 (2005).
20. Id. at 25.
21. Id. at 26-27.
22. Cade Metz, Spy Stoppers, PC Magazine, Mar. 2, 2004, at 81, available at
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,4149,1524223,00.asp.
23. See Sharon Weinbar, The Spyware Inferno (Aug. 13, 2004), at
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has grown around adware, including companies such as Claria Inc.
(formerly Gator Inc.), 180Solutions, and eXact Advertising," and
many large companies see adware as an effective advertising
method.25
In contrast, malware and stealware are more malicious forms of
spyware typically authored by hackers or cyber criminals engaged in
intentionally criminal activity which is damaging to the end user. 6
Malicious spyware programs typically perform a number of more
intrusive actions once installed on a user's computer. Some of the
more common functions are: "(1) gathering private personal
information; (2) stealing confidential information, such as passwords,
bank records, social security numbers, personal and business
correspondence, and credit card information; (3) opening a
'backdoor' on the system which allows other programs to connect to
and manipulate the system; and (4) enabling a spyware operator to
take over an infected system., 27 These spyware programs can also
capture a user's keystrokes,2 manipulate computer system settings,
download and install other programs, and auto-update themselves. 9
Although dangerous to the end user, malicious spyware can be
particularly damaging inside a corporate network, where financial
and business documents, customer records, and proprietary
information may all be accessible.3"
http://news.com.com/2010-1032-5307831.html (discussing how revenues for low end
software applications have shifted away from cheap license fees over to advertising using
adware).
24. See Benjamin Edelman, Investors Supporting Spyware, at
http://www.benedelman.org/spyware/investors/ (listing investors for major adware
companies).
25. See Benjamin Edelman, Advertisers Using WhenU, at
http://www.benedelman.org/spyware/whenu-advertisers/ (listing several prominent clients
of WhenU Inc., an adware company, including Travelocity, Best Western, T-Mobile,
Merck, and Sprint PCS); Sharon Weinbar, The Spyware Inferno (Aug. 13, 2004), at
http://news.com.com/2010-1032-5307831.html (describing DirecTV's use of adware
application)
26. See Brett Levy, Electrons; Beware the Web's Voyeurs, L.A. Times, Sept. 23, 2004,
at F7 (describing malware as a more dangerous type of spyware, often used by identity
theft rings to steal credit card numbers and passwords); ERBSCHLOE, supra note 19, at 28-
29 (describing famous stealware scam which used computer user's modem line to place
expensive long distance calls).
27. Aladdin Systems, supra note 6, at 4.
28. Cade Metz, supra note 22, at 81.
29. Michelle Delio, Spyware Infiltrates the Enterprise (Oct. 4, 2004), at
http://www.infoworld.com/article/04/10/01/40FEspywarel.html.
30. Aladdin Systems, supra note 6, at 4. See, e.g., Napoli, supra note 7 (keystroke
logging spyware program used to steal 450 online banking passwords from Kinko's
internet terminals); Metz, supra note 22, at 81 (AOL employees downloaded a trojan
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Many choose not to recognize a separation between adware and
malicious spyware, viewing both as belonging to one category of
undesirable software. 3' Both forms can take up valuable computer
resources, interfere with legitimate user applications, and pose
significant problems for a user's privacy. Others distinguish between
spyware programs which only run locally on a user's computer and
33those which transmit user information to a remote server.
Ultimately, defining and categorizing spyware is an incredibly
difficult task given the thousands of different spyware variants that
currently exist.' Although classifying spyware programs based on
their behavior and characteristics is incredibly difficult, there is an
important separation between spyware authored by large, readily
identifiable adware companies, and that authored by unknown cyber-
criminals: the former may be regulated more easily than the latter.
Throughout this note I will use the term adware to refer to
commercially oriented spyware programs that primarily target
advertising to the user to generate advertising revenue. I will use the
terms malicious spyware, malware, and stealware to refer to spyware
programs designed to accomplish overtly criminal acts which are
damaging to the end user. I will use the term spyware generically to
refer to both typesof programs, but will distinguish between the two
whenever it is important.
B. Where Does Spyware Come From?
Spyware gains access to a user's computer through a variety of
surreptitious techniques. Often, spyware programs are bundled with
desirable free software applications, such as a peer-to-peer client like
Kazaa, and notification of the spyware program's presence will be
listed in the end user license agreement (EULA) for the software
during installation.3 ' However, the EULAs for these programs
program that "pillaged the company's customer database"); Chris Morris, Playable version
of Half-Life 2 Stolen (Oct. 7, 2003), at
http://money.cnn.com/2003/10/07/commentary/game-over/column__gaming/ (keystroke
logging spyware program used to steal the source code of the popular video game Half
Life 2 before the game was released).
31. See Metz, supra note 22, at 80-81 (refusing to distinguish adware from spyware,
PC Magazine's policy is to qualify "any application that tracks your behavior without your
knowledge" as spyware).
32. Aladdin Systems, supra note 6, at 4.
33. Id. at 5.
34. See Metz, supra note 22, at 80 (according to PestPatrol, an anti-spyware vendor,
there are over 78,000 known spyware programs loose on the internet).
35. Aladdin Systems, supra note 6, at 9.
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usually contain hundreds of lines of legal disclaimers that are virtually
indecipherable to end users.36 When users refuse to read the EULA,
or become confused by its terms, they simply agree to proceed with
the installation, unknowingly consenting to the installation of spyware
on their computer.37
Spyware also installs itself by exploiting features of some internet
browsers, most notably, the ActiveX function in Microsoft's Internet
Explorer. The spyware program will present itself as part of an
ActiveX package to be installed, something that many legitimate
plug-ins and applets often utilize.39 As a result, the user is fooled into
thinking they are installing a legitimate application that is useful or
necessary for viewing the website they are currently visiting. ' This
method is commonly referred to as a "drive-by download," and
depending on a user's internet browser version and security settings,
sometimes the spyware is installed with no notification to the user at
all. 1 Thus, a user may end up installing spyware on their system
simply by visiting a website
Spyware programs may also be installed as part of a computer
virus, worm, or trojan program.43  A computer worm is a self
replicating software program that is able to infect computers with no
user interaction. '  In this way, they differ from computer viruses,
which require human action in order to infect and replicate, usually in
the form of the user running an executable file or opening an email.45
Trojan programs are malicious software programs that disguise
themselves as useful legitimate applications.' Once any of these
forms of malicious code gains access to a system, they can be used to
install a spyware program "payload" with which they were bundled.4 7
36. Id.
37. Id. See also Michael Hiltzick, Bill Lacks Heft When a Target Shows Support, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2004, at C9 (describing Claria's adware license as 6000 words long in
small print).
38. Aladdin Systems, supra note 6, at 9.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Benjamin Edelman, Methods and Effects of Spyware: Response to FTC Call for
Comments (Mar. 19, 2004), at 8-10, at http://www.benedelman.org/spyware/ftc-031904.pdf.
42. Id.
43. Aladdin Systems, supra note 6, at 9.
44. See ERBSCHLOE, supra note 19, at 23.
45. See Manashi Mukherjee, Q&A: Sasser Worm Explained, May 8, 2004, at
http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/internet/05/08/sasser.qanda/index.html
46. See ERBSCHLOE, supra note 19, at 22; Earthlink Spy Audit, at
http://www.earthlink.net/spyaudit/press/.
47. Aladdin Systems, supra note 6, at 9.
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Although there is no strict rule, adware programs often use the first
two techniques of installation, surreptitiously bundling themselves
with free software, or performing ActiveX drive-by downloads.
4
8
Malicious spyware programs often use worms, viruses, and trojan
programs to gain access to a user's computer.49
C. Difficulties of Removing Spyware
One of the largest challenges facing users with computer systems
infected with spyware is detecting and removing the unwanted
programs.5  Unlike traditional computer viruses, which infect a
system with a single file, a spyware program can plant thousands of
files on a system and defend itself from removal.5 Spyware program
files often work cooperatively to regenerate deleted partner files, and
designers often "use random file names and reshuffle file locations to
make detection and removal more difficult."52 The proliferation of
spyware has sparked huge consumer demand for software that can
effectively detect and remove spyware programs.53 More than 50 such
applications are available on the internet, many as free downloads,
and many large internet service providers now offer spyware removal
tools as part of their service. 4 However, some spyware removal
applications have been accused of actually installing more spyware
programs, further complicating the removal process.5 Additionally,
48. See, e.g., Benjamin Edelman, Gator's EULA Gone Bad (Nov. 29, 2004), at
http://www.benedelman.org/news/112904-1.html (describing drive by download technique
used by prominent adware application).
49. See, e.g., Paul Roberts, RSA: Microsoft on "rootkits "; Be afraid, Be Very Afraid
(Feb. 17, 2005), at
http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/story/0,10801,99843,00.html
(describing how a new undetectable form of malware known as a "rootkit" is installed
"typically without the users knowledge, either by a virus or after a successful hack of the
computer's defenses"); Metz, supra note 22, at 81 (malware was installed at AOL through
use of a trojan program).
50. See John Borland, Spyware Cures May Cause More Harm than Good (Feb. 24,
2004), at http://news.com.com/Spyware+cures+may+cause+more+harm+than+good/2100-
1032_3-5153485.html ("Like viruses, adware and spyware can sneak into a computer's
hard drive with little or no warning and can hide their tracks in ways that make it difficult
for even the most sophisticated computer users to find and permanently delete").
51. Information Technology Association of America, Spyware, Supportware,
Noticeware, Adware and the Internet (Sep. 2004), at 3, at
http://www.itaa.org/news/docs/adwarewp.pdf.
52. Id. at 3-4.
53. See Borland, supra note 50.
54. Id. (Earthlink and America Online now provide spyware removal tools to their
subscribers).
55. See, e.g., id. (SpyBan removal tool tested by CNET appeared to place spyware
programs on users system).
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spyware authors continue to find new ways to avoid detection and
removal. A new generation of system monitoring programs called
"rootkits" has been discovered by Microsoft security researchers.56
These spyware applications insert themselves into the kernel of the
operating system, and are thus "almost impossible to detect using
current security products," usually requiring a user to completely
reinstall their operating system if infection is suspected . These new
forms of spyware emphasize the importance of preventing infection,
as detecting and removing these spyware programs after the fact can
be nearly impossible.
HI. Anti-Spyware Legislation
A. State Anti-Spyware Legislation
1. Utah the First State to Act
In the face of the growing spyware epidemic, many states have
passed or are drafting anti-spyware legislation. Utah was the first
state to act, passing the Spyware Control Act in 2004."9 WhenU Inc.,
an adware vendor, quickly challenged the constitutionality of the law,
alleging that it infringed free speech rights and attempted to regulate
interstate commerce. 6°  WhenU was successful in obtaining a
preliminary injunction blocking the implementation of the law.61
However, before a trial on the merits could be held, the act was
significantly amended, essentially amounting to a complete rewrite.
Although the original version of Utah's Spyware Control Act has now
been preliminarily enjoined from application, and subsequently
amended, it prompted a national debate about anti-spyware
legislation and was considered a success for consumers by some
experts. 63 The approach taken by the original law, as well as the
56. See Roberts, supra note 49.
57. Id.
58. See ERBSCHLOE, supra note 19, at 26 (Utah, Iowa, California, and New York are
all considering or have already enacted anti-spyware legislation).
59. Utah Code Ann. § 13-40-101 (Supp. 2004)(amended 2005).
60. Pamela Parker & Janis Mara, When U Wins Injunction Against Utah Spyware Law
(June 23, 2004), at http://www.clickz.com/news/article.php/3372291.
61. Id.
62. Spyware Control Act Revisions, H.B. 104, Gen. Sess. (Ut. 2005). See also Matt
Canham, Utahns Might Get Some Relief from Spyware; Computer Pop-up Ads; A State
Lawmaker Says a New Act to Counteract the Invasive Software is a Good Start; Lawmaker
Sets His Sights on Spyware, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, March 21, 2005, at Al.
63. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
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criticism raised against it, is worth discussion. To avoid confusion, the
original version of the act will be referred to as the Spyware Control
Act of 2004.
Utah's Spyware Control Act of 2004 created a private cause of
action open to website owners and operators, trademark or copyright
holders, and authorized internet advertisers, allowing them to bring
suit against violators for damages of $10,000 per violation. 6 The act
prohibited installing spyware, enabling the installation of spyware,
and displaying advertisements that obstruct a website's paid
advertising or other content in a way that "interferes with a user's
ability to view an internet website." 65 Although this sounds fairly
straightforward, the act's complexity was wrapped up in its long and
intricate description of which types of software qualify as spyware for
purposes of the act.66  In general, the act prohibited software
applications that monitor a computer's usage, send that information
to a "remote computer," or display ads on the computer in response
to information gathered about the computer's usage.67 In order to
avoid being a violation of the act, a software application was required
to provide users with notice of the program's actions through a
license agreement, obtain the user's consent before performing any of
the listed actions, and provide the user with an easy method of
removing the software from their computer that would not interfere
with other non-affiliated software applications.6 The act also
provided a list of explicit exceptions that didn't qualify as spyware,
including software designed to diagnose and resolve technical
difficulties, and software used solely to report user information to an
internet website that was previously stored on the user's computer by
the website.69
The Spyware Control Act of 2004 was criticized and opposed by
software industry groups as being overly broad in defining spyware,
allegedly including many legitimate forms of commercial software,
such as parental control and virus definition update applications.0
64. Utah Code Ann. § 13-40-301 (Supp. 2004) (amended 2005).
65. Id. at § 13-40-201(1)(c) (amended 2005).
66. Id. at § 13-40-102(8) (amended 2005). See also Benjamin Edelman, A Close
Reading of Utah's Spyware Control Act, at http://www.benedelman.org/spyware/utah-
marO4/ (flowchart graphically depicting the elaborate definition of spyware provided by
Utah's Spyware Control Act).
67. Utah Code Ann. § 13-40-102(4)(Supp. 2004)(amended 2005).
68. Id. at § 13-40-102(4)(c)(amended 2005).
69. Id. at § 13-40-102(5)(amended 2005) (exception specifically includes cookies,
javascript, and html code).
70. See Declan McCullough, Few Solutions pop up at FTC Adware Workshop (Apr.
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These industry critics claimed that the act could actually be damaging
to computer security by stifling important and legitimate efforts by
technology and security companies to collect and analyze data
771
regarding virus attacks on the internet.7 Although technology groups
voiced similar concerns, much of this criticism was persuasively
refuted by spyware expert Ben Edelman. 73 As an example, Edelman
concedes that many virus definition update programs transmit user
information to a remote server in order to diagnose and cure
infections, an action that is often associated with spyware and
prohibited by the act.7 ' However, Edelman points out that almost
every legitimate anti-virus application will adequately notify users of
this action and obtain their consent, thereby satisfying the notice and
consent provision and avoiding violation.75 The notice and consent
provision would seemingly place any legitimate software application
outside the scope of the act.76 Additionally, the act made a special
exception for applications designed to diagnose and resolve technical
difficulties, allowing further leeway for important security software."
78The Act was also opposed by adware companies, including
WhenU Inc., as it prohibited many of the more offensive actions
taken by adware products, including abusive pop-up advertising7 9 and
surreptitious installation methods.' Technology groups and adware
companies argue that overly strict regulation of adware applications
19, 2004), at http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-5195222.html ("Software companies
warned of poorly written laws targeting spyware that could inadvertently affect legitimate
products like smut-filtering software or security update mechanisms."); Anita Ramasastry,
Can Utah's New Anti-Spyware Law Work?, Jun. 3, 2004, at
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/06/03/ramasastry.spyware/index.html (American Online,
Amazon.com, Cnet, eBay, Google, Microsoft Corp. and Yahoo all commented that the
definition of spyware in the Utah law "encompasses several types of important and
beneficial internet communications software, and even routine network
communications"); Information Technology Association of America, supra note 51, at 6.
71. Ramasastry, supra note 70 (software companies "fear, for instance, that the Act
prohibits information technology and security companies from collecting data to analyze
and prevent virus attacks").
72. See, e.g., Information Technology Association of America, supra note 51, at 6.




77. Utah Code Ann. § 13-39-102(5)(a)(Supp. 2004)(amended 2005).
78. See Stefanie Olsen, Adware Maker Challenges Utah Anti-Spyware Law, Apr. 13,
2004, at http://news.com.com/Adware+maker+challenges+Utah+anti-spyware+law/ 2100-
1024_3-5190880.html; Edelman, supra note 66 (not surprised to see adware companies
criticizing Utah's Spyware Control Act).
79. Utah Code Ann. § 13-40-102(4)(b)(ii)(D) (Supp. 2004)(amended 2005).
80. Id. at § 13-40-102(4)(c)(i)(amended 2005).
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could potentially decrease the amount of free software available to
users under the adware model." However, the notice and consent
provision seemed to solve this problem elegantly, too; users could
still take advantage of free adware applications, they just had to be
notified of the application's actions and effects and consent to the
terms provided. What the act would not allow were the deceptive
installation techniques still used by many adware companies, such as
drive-by downloads, to force their adware applications upon
unsuspecting users.83 In this way, Utah's Spyware Control Act of 2004
left the decision of whether or not to run adware in the hands of the
user, but required that users be given the information to make an
informed decision. Due to its strict notice and consent provision,
tough treatment of obnoxious adware practices, and allowance of a
private cause of action, Utah's Spyware Control Act of 2004 was
viewed by some experts as an effective law for protecting consumer
interests.8
The amendment to the Spyware Control Act (the "amended
act"), enacted in 2005, significantly altered the 2004 version of the act.
The amended act's definition of spyware is much narrower, defining
spyware essentially as software that collects information about the
user and uses the information to display pop-up advertising - basically
limiting the act to regulation of adware. 85 The definition does not
contain an exception for programs which obtain the consent of the
computer user, allowing for a violation even where the user consents
to the program's actions.' The conduct prohibited by the act is
significantly narrower as well, essentially limiting violations to pop-up
advertising triggered by trademarks or protected web-site addresses.87
The act also requires that a trademark infringement be present in
order for there to be a violation of the act.' Associate Law Professor
81. See Information Technology Association of America, supra note 51, at 6 (overly
strict laws "would undermine ad-supported business models and force content providers
to move to fee-based services"); Olsen, supra note 78 (adware companies claim that the
law poses "potential threats" to their business model).
82. Utah Code Ann. § 13-40-102(4)(c)(i) (Supp. 2004)(amended 2005).
83. Edelman, supra note 66.
84. See id.; Ramasastry, supra note 70 ("a close examination of industry and other
critiques of Utah's new Spyware Control Act shows them to be unpersuasive").
85. Utah Code Ann. § 13-40-102(7)(a)(i) & (ii).
86. Eric Goldman, Technology and Marketing Law Blog: Utah Amends Spyware
Control Act (Mar. 22 2005), at http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2005/03/
utahamends_spy.htm.
87. Utah Code Ann. § 13-40-201.
88. Id. at § 13-40-201(1)(b).
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Eric Goldman, of Marquette University Law School, criticizes the
law's focus on protecting trademark holder's rights, claiming the law
is "not about protecting consumers, but about limiting competition. "89
Professor Goldman also criticizes the act's reliance on trademark
infringement in defining what constitutes a violation of the act.9
Because it is unclear whether contextual advertising triggered by the
presence of a trademark represents a trademark use, Professor
Goldman fears that the law could be very difficult to violate.9'
Unfortunately, because Utah amended the Spyware Control Act
before WhenU's challenge could be given a full trial on the merits, we
will likely never know whether or not the Spyware Control Act of
2004 was indeed unconstitutional in whole or in part. However, it
remains an important first attempt which set off debate over the
relevant issues, and prompted the federal government to consider the
problem more seriously. The Spyware Control Act of 2004's strict
notice and consent provision was viewed as an effective method of
regulating spyware, 9 and a similar provision was included in the latest
federal bill.93  Although preliminarily enjoined, and ultimately
rewritten, spyware expert Ben Edelman found the law to be effective
for protecting consumers from spyware, and it therefore may be a
useful model for other states to consider.94
2. California Follows Suit
California's efforts to follow Utah's lead were met with
skepticism and criticism.95 California passed the Consumer Protection
Against Spyware Act in 2004, which became effective on January 1,
2005.' The act generally prohibits software applications that, through
"intentionally deceptive means," modify certain aspects of a
89. See Goldman, supra note 86.
90. Eric Goldman, Technology and Marketing Law Blog: Alaska's Anti-Adware Law
(June 22,2005), at http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2005/06/index.htm.
91. Eric Goldman, Technology and Marketing Law Blog: Important 2d Circuit Case -
1800 Contacts v. WhenU (June 28, 2005), at http://blog.ericgoldman.org
/archives/2005/06/index.htm ("Under the Second Circuit's reasoning, the Utah anti-adware
law is currently ineffective against adware vendors.. .because it requires trademark
infringement as an essential element of the claim, and the lack of trademark use means
that WhenU is not committing trademark infringement as a matter of law.").
92. See Edelman, supra note 66.
93. See infra Part III.B.
94. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
95. See generally Hiltzick, supra note 37; Joseph Menn, Consumer Groups Seek Veto
of Bill on Spyware, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18,2004, at Cl; Kuchinskas, supra note 14.
96. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22947 (West Supp. 2005).
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computer system's settings,' or collect various types of user
information off a user's computer. 9 The act lists out specific types of
software conduct that are prohibited, including: using a computer to
transmit computer viruses by mail; accessing the computer's modem
in a way that incurs financial harm to the user; using the computer as
part of a group of computers that systematically attack another
computer; and opening multiple pop-up ads in the user's web browser
to the extent that a reasonable user couldn't disable the ads without
turning off the computer or closing the web browser.' The act
creates a private cause of action for consumers, allowing for damages
of $1,000 per violation. °
Privacy groups have criticized the act for requiring that alleged
violators intentionally deceive users in order to be in violation."'
They argue that programs that perform actions prohibited by the act
should be considered per se violations, and that having to
demonstrate intent on the part of the spyware author seriously
reduces the law's effectiveness." The act has also been criticized for
not being as tough on obnoxious adware tactics as Utah's Spyware
Control Act of 2004.103 Support and participation provided by
prominent adware companies throughout the legislative process have
been cited as an indication of the law's lenience toward adware
vendors.' 4  Although the act does prohibit excessive pop-up
advertising, it requires that the pop-ups be too much for a
"reasonable user" to handle without turning off the computer or
disabling the web browser, a fairly confusing standard.05 More
importantly, the law also lacks the notice and consent provision that
Utah's Spyware Control Act of 2004 contained.'
B. Federal Anti-Spyware Legislation
Federal legislators have been debating the spyware problem for
several years, considering a number of different bills aimed at curbing
97. Id. at § 22947.2(a).
98. Id. at § 22947.2(b).
99. Id. at § 22947.3(a).
100. Kuchinskas, supra note 14.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Hiltzick, supra note 37, at C9.
104. Id.
105. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22947.3(a)(4) (West Supp. 2005).
106. See Hiltzick, supra note 37, at C9.
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spyware usage." The Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber
Trespass Act (Spy Act) was introduced in the House of
Representatives in January 2005, and would create a civil cause of
action against spyware authors.' This same bill passed the House in
2004 by a margin of 399-1,'0 but was unable to gain Senate approval." °
The Internet Spyware Prevention Act, also called the I-Spy Act,"' has
also been introduced in the House of Representatives, and would
impose criminal sanctions against spyware users."2 The Senate has
been considering its own anti-spyware bill, The Software Principles
Yielding Better Levels of Consumer Knowledge Act (SpyBlock Act),
which would also impose civil liability for spyware use."' Although
these bills will likely be combined during the legislative process if
ultimately passed into law, this note will focus on analyzing the civil
causes of action created by the Spy Act.
The Spy Act begins in section 2 by listing a number of "deceptive
acts" that are prohibited, including taking control of a computer,
modifying settings relating to internet usage, collecting personally
identifiable information by logging a user's keystrokes, and inducing a
user to install a software component onto their computer. 4 The list is
long and detailed, including many other actions, and the act directs
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to provide guidance regarding
compliance with the section.'
107. See, e.g., Controlling Invasive and Unauthorized Software Act ,S.2131, 108th
Cong. (2004); Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act, H.R. 2929, 108th
Cong. (2004); Software Principles Yielding Better Levels of Consumer Knowledge Act, S.
2145, 108th Cong. (2004); Spyware Control and Privacy Protection Act, S.3180, 106th
Cong. (2000).
108. H.R. 29, 109th Cong. (2005).
109. Jason Tuohey, Spyware Bill Passes House (Oct. 5, 2004), at
http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,118069,00.asp.
110. Grant Gross, Congresswoman Reintroduces Spyware Bill, Jan. 5, 2005, at
http://www.nwfusion.com/news/2005/0105congrreint.html.
111. H.R. 744, 109th Cong., (2005).
112. The I-Spy Act imposes criminal sanctions on persons using spyware to access
unauthorized computers to commit a federal crime, steal personal information, or
circumvent security protections with the intent of "defrauding or injuring the computer
owner." Grant Gross, U.S. House Passes Antispyware Bills (May 24, 2005), at
http://www.pcworld.comlnews/article/0,aid,120985,00.asp.
113. S. 687, 109h Cong. (2005). See also Grant Gross, Spyware Foes Push New Law
(Nov. 21, 2005), at http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,123626,00.asp ("In addition
to prohibiting spyware, the Software Principles Yielding Better Levels of Consumer
Knowledge (SPYBLOCK) Act would also outlaw the installation of adware programs
without a computer user's permission.").
114. H.R. 29, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005).
115. Id. at § 2(b).
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The Spy Act also contains a notice and consent provision, laid
out in section 3, requiring "information gathering programs" to
clearly notify the user of their actions and obtain user consent before
being installed."6 Specifically, programs must: (1) provide notice that
is clearly distinguished from other information presented to the user;
(2) allow an option which displays clearly to the user what types of
specific actions the program will perform; and (3) easily allow the
user to consent to the program's installation, or to entirely abandon
the installation without granting or denying consent."7 The act also
lists specific language that is sufficient to properly notify the user of
their right to grant or deny consent to the program's installation,
requiring that programs use the exemplary language or a
"substantially similar statement.""' 8 The Spy Act does not create a
private cause of action, specifying that enforcement will be conducted
solely by the FTC."9 The act allows damages of up to 3 million dollars
per offense, 2° and preempts any state laws that regulate conduct
similar to that described by the act.'
Critics first question whether this law is necessary at all, pointing
to other federal laws that essentially cover conduct prohibited by the
act.'22 The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) 3 gives the FTC
power to prosecute against unfair and deceptive trade practices,
providing: "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce are hereby declared unlawful."'24 The FTC successfully
brought suit under this provision against two adware companies,
alleging that their exploitation of known security weaknesses in
Microsoft products to install spyware programs without a user's
knowledge or authorization represented a violation of the act.' The
court noted that although the activities at issue did not "necessarily fit
116. Id. at § 3(a)(1).
117. Id. at § 3(c).
118. Id. at § 3(c)(1)(B).
119. Id. at § 4(a).
120. Id. at § 4(b)(1)(a)(A).
121. Id. at § 6(a).
122. See Information Technology Association of America, supra note 51, at 5
("Existing law addresses most of the illicit behaviors of spyware makers"); Benjamin
Edelman, What Hope for Federal Anti-Spyware Legislation, at
http://www.benedelman.org/news/011905-1.html (finding § 2 of the Spy Act "puzzling
because many, if not most, of the specified practices are already prohibited by existing
law").
123. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2000).
124. Id. at § 45(a)(1).
125. F.T.C. v. Seismic Entm't Prod., Inc., No. CIV.04-377-JD, 2004 WL 2403124, *1
(D.N.H 2004).
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into the traditional concepts of unfair and deceptive acts" under the
FTCA, the injuries that users experienced combined with the fact that
no notification of the harmful activities was disclosed to them, made
the defendant's actions deceptive and unfair.1 26 However, the FTC's
apparent reluctance to pursue spyware authors may detract from the
effectiveness of the FTCA. 27 Additionally, the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act allows federal agencies to prosecute individuals who
engage in fraudulent computer transactions.128 This act would
specifically apply to malicious spyware programs that steal user
passwords or other confidential information.29 The Electronic
Communications Privacy Act 130 could also be used to combat spyware,
prohibiting the interception of communications without a court order
or consent of one of the parties.131 While this may not be effective in
combating spyware programs which gather user information off a
computer's hard drive, it could be used to prevent spyware programs
from monitoring web browsing and "click-thru" data.
Beyond being potentially unnecessary, critics point to many flaws
in the act itself. The requirement that offensive acts under §2 be
"deceptive" has been criticized as being poorly defined in the act, and
will not have much substance until the FTC clarifies the provisions
with guidance documents.133 The notice and consent provisions have
also been criticized for allowing "substantially similar language" to
that provided in the act, and for allowing a single notice to satisfy the
installation of multiple programs.' Due to these allowances, this
provision would likely be satisfied by the current spyware installation
technique in which a single notice of the presence of multiple spyware
programs is hidden within a large, confusing end user license
agreement (EULA).1 35  The FTC's current position on consent
considers a user's acceptance of such a EULA to be determinative of
that user giving consent, suggesting that this installation technique
could act to completely avoid section 2 enforcement. 136  Spyware
126. Id. at *3.
127. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
128. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
129. Information Technology Association of America, supra note 51, at 6.
130. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
131. Information Technology Association of America, supra note 51, at 6.
132. Id.






expert Ben Edelman gives an example of the installation for a peer-
to-peer file sharing client named Grokster, which displays a 120-page
EULA for an adware application made by Claria Inc., followed by a
278-page EULA for half a dozen other related applications. " 7 Until
the FTC develops further guidance on what "deceptive" includes, this
practice would likely not violate the act.' Edelman also
demonstrates how the weak notice and consent provision could also
allow the drive-by download technique, discussed above, to avoid
violation under the act."9
Edelman further points out that the act would do little to curb
potential affiliate company abuses." A common tactic employed by
adware companies is to contract with an affiliate that will install their
software on a commission basis, usually providing a nominal fee for
each installation. "' When the adware application is installed using
deceptive techniques, the adware company can claim "deceptive
distribution," alleging that they were not aware that their affiliate
partners were employing deceptive tactics.' 2 By failing to address this
common practice, Congress is allowing another method by which
spyware and adware vendors may avoid liability for deceptive
installation techniques.143
Edelman also criticizes the act for giving the FTC sole authority
to enforce its provisions.'" The FTC has only brought a single anti-
spyware case to date,"'5 and has failed to act on other well
documented cases involving deceptive spyware installation through
known security holes.' 6 Placing enforcement power in the hands of
public elected state attorneys general would give consumers more
direct lobbying power to fight egregious violations.' 7 Allowing
private parties to sue, such as website operators or Internet Service
Providers, would also spur enforcement of the act by providing a
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Edelman, supra note 122.
140. Id.
141. Id. (example of 180Solutions offering affiliates a commission based on the




145. See Edelman, supra note 122; F.T.C. v. Seismic Entm't Prod., Inc., No. CIV.04-
377-JD, 2004 WL 2403124 (D.N.H. 2004).
146. See Edelman, supra note 122.
147. Id.
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significant financial incentive to pursue violators.'9 Edelman also
finds the act's preemption provision problematic, pointing out that
the act could displace tougher state laws if improvements aren't
made. 9 Ultimately, the passage of the Spy Act could act to fill space,
preventing the passage of stricter, more effective federal anti-spyware
legislation simply by already being on the books.'
IV. Moving Beyond Legislation
It seems clear that crafting legislation which precisely prohibits
spyware but does not interfere with legitimate computer programs,
constitutional rights, and arguably viable business models is
extremely difficult. Although the Spy Act has been highly criticized,
spyware expert Ben Edelman claims that with a few minor fixes, the
law could be very effective.' Utah's Spyware Control Act of 2004
was generally viewed as an effective law for protecting end-users, and
creating similar federal legislation that successfully incorporated any
constitutional issues brought by WhenU Inc. against the law would
create a consistent nationwide standard for spyware usage. 52 But
even if the Spy Act was improved to address all the above criticism, it
would still only be addressing part of the problem. At their best,
these laws essentially act to regulate the adware industry, enforcing
notice and consent provisions that prevent deceptive installation
techniques whereby users unknowingly, but voluntarily, install
spyware or adware onto their computer. "3  These provisions
obviously do little to combat malicious spyware authors that use
computer viruses and worms to install their spyware applications, a
situation in which users often have little or no knowledge of the
installation.'- Although the use of malicious spyware is clearly an
illegal activity, and many federal laws address the problem,
55





152. See Edelman, supra note 66; Ramasastry, supra note 70.
153. See H.R. 29, 109th Cong. § 3(a)(1) (2005) (notice and consent provision in federal
Spy Act); Utah Code Ann. § 13-390-102(4)(D) (Supp. 2004)(amended 2005) (notice and
consent provision in Utah's Spyware Control Act).
154. See Dan Gillmor, Anti-Spyware Bill Lacks Teeth, San Jose Mercury News, Sept.
22, 2004, at C1 ('Spyware typically makes its way onto hard disks without the knowledge
of the user").
155. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000 & Supp. II 2002);
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
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extremely problematic."' Webroot Systems speculates that the
majority of spyware authors are located in Eastern Europe,"7 making
them difficult to locate and prosecute. Addressing this side of the
spyware problem is much more difficult than its adware counterpart,
as adware companies are large economic entities that can easily be
identified and associated with illegal software applications. This is
not to say that the adware industry doesn't need regulation; an
effective federal law is desperately needed to standardize allowable
practices for this controversial industry, particularly given the
constitutional challenges raised against Utah's Spyware Control Act
of 2004. However, it should be recognized that this is only part of the
solution; in order to truly protect users from the dangers of all forms
of spyware, other actions must be taken. Due to the difficulties of
pursuing cyber criminals on the Internet, and the difficult and costly
process of detecting and removing spyware from an infected system,
technological solutions may prove far more effective at protecting
computer users from spyware than any anti-spyware legislation.
A. Spyware's Prominence on the Windows Operating System
According to Webroot Systems, spyware is only found on
computers running Microsoft's Windows operating system.
59
Although a few computer worms written for Linux and Apple
operating systems have been detected, the overwhelming majority of
worms, viruses, and trojan programs are also written specifically for
the Windows operating system.' The specific targeting of Windows
is in part due to the overwhelming market share that Microsoft holds
in the PC desktop operating system market; 96% of desktop PCs
worldwide run Microsoft Windows, with only 2.8% running Apple
operating systems, and 1% running Linux.1 61 In addition, Microsoft
Windows operating system has a reputation for having a very poor
156. See Rupley, supra note 18; Tedeschi, supra note 17.
157. John Leyden, Webroot: Spyware is Windows-only, Oct. 12, 2004, at
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/10/12/spyware/ ("According to Webroot, the majority of
spyware developers are based in Eastern Europe and come from a similar background as
virus authors, though it doesn't know this for sure").
158. See Jim Harper, Laws Won't Fix Spyware Problem (Mar. 6, 2005), at
http://www.foxnews.comlstory/0,2933,149490,00.html ("The solutions for spam and




161. Steve Lohr, One Small Step in Uphill Fight as Linux adds a Media Player, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 2004, at C4 (citing research study conducted by Gartner Inc.).
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security model, and has been exploited by some of the most well
known computer viruses and worms on the Internet.62  The
combination of such a homogenous operating system market,
dominated by a product seemingly riddled with security flaws, has
been claimed to be a major cause of the burgeoning internet
computer security epidemic.'
Microsoft's monopolistic position and tactics have continually
been questioned by the federal government and various foreign
countries. 6' Although Microsoft's actions have been repeatedly
challenged as anti-competitive and damaging to the software
market,65  critics argue that their anti-competitive practices pose
significant problems for computer security as well.'6 The company
attempts to lock users to its platform by tightly coupling its software
applications with its operating system, ensuring that users that grow
accustomed to their applications will be forced to run their operating
system.16 This tight coupling between the software applications and
the operating system is achieved by using very complex and
undocumented interfaces and communication protocols, also referred
to as application programming interfaces (APIs), through which the
applications inter-operate with the operating system and one
another.'6 This design method allows Microsoft to change the
interfaces and protocols at will, and ensures that competitors won't be
162. See Cade Metz, Is Microsoft to Blame?, PC Magazine, Aug. 3, 2004, at 73,
available at http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,1759,1618553,00.asp (according to security
software company Sophos, six of the top ten viruses of 2003 were aimed specifically at
Windows, including the Blaster worm, which by most accounts, infected more than 10
million machines).
163. See Dan Geer et al., Cyberinsecurity: The Cost of Monopoly, at 3, at
http://www.ccianet.org/papers/cyberinsecurity.pdf; Tony Bradley, Microsoft Monoculture,
at http://netsecurity.about.com/cs/generalsecurity/i/issuemono.htm (discussing the
Cyberinsecurity report).
164. See A History of Microsoft Investigations, Oct. 20, 1997, at
http://news.com.com/A+history+of+Microsoft+investigations/210-01-3-204426.html
(listing antitrust investigations of Microsoft from 1990-1997); Paul La Monica, Bad
Remedy for Microsoft (Mar. 24, 2004), at
http://money.cnn.com/2004/03/24/technology/microsoft/ (European Union fined Microsoft
$611.8 million for antitrust violations, and required Microsoft to offer a version of
Windows without Windows Media Player within 90 days).
165. See U.S. v. Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 44 (D.D.C. 2000), rev'd 253 F.3d 34 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) ("Microsoft's anti-competitive actions trammeled the competitive process
through which the computer software industry generally stimulates innovation and
conduces to the optimum benefit of consumers.")
166. See generally Geer et al., supra note 163.
167. Id. at 13.
168. Id. at 12-13.
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able to provide similar software applications on other platforms.6 9
Microsoft's use of this tactic was a major issue in the latest federal
antitrust action against the company."O Although reversed in part on
appeal, the district court concluded that Microsoft had used its
monopoly position to prevent competitors' development of cross
platform software applications that would "erode the application
barrier" that Microsoft used to preserve its operating system
monopoly.17'
Although aimed at keeping users tied to its platform, Microsoft's
critics have claimed that intentionally designing software to be
complex has the unhappy side affect of increasing the potential for
security problems.' As software becomes more complex, it becomes
more difficult and costly to ensure its security quality.'73 Software
quality experts often characterize software complexity as being
proportional to source code volume.'74 The vast volume of source
code contained in Microsoft's Windows operating system and its
alarming rate of growth, set Microsoft apart from other software
companies, and indicate that, according to the above relationship
between source code volume and security flaws, its products are more
susceptible to security problems than those of its competitors. 175 In
this way, Microsoft's anti-competitive practices not only act to ensure
its monopoly position, but may directly contribute to the security
problems that its products have experienced. 76 The end result of this
anti-competitive behavior has been referred to as the "Microsoft
monoculture": a market dominated by a single operating system
which is highly prone to security exploitation. Once a security flaw
is found in the Windows operating system, hackers can exploit an
169. Id. at 13.
170. U.S. v. Microsoft, 87 F.Supp. 2d 30, 38 (D. D.C. 2000), rev'd 253 F.3d 34 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (discussion of Microsoft's campaign against middleware providers to prevent
the "development of enough full-featured, cross platform applications to erode the
applications barrier").
171. Id.
172. See Geer et al., supra note 163, at 14.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. See also Metz, supra note 162, at 74 (discussing the problems that overly large
software applications pose for development of quality products, noting that Windows XP
operating system contains some "40 million" lines of code).
176. See Jamais Cascio, The Ecology of Computer Viruses, Apr. 7, 1999, at
http://archive.salon.com/techfeature/1999/04/07/melissa/ (discussing how the Melissa
computer virus used weak security features in tightly coupled Microsoft applications Word
and Outlook to replicate).
177. See Bradley, supra note 163.
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overwhelming majority of the computers on the internet in an
identical manner.1
78
B. Encouraging Technological Solutions
Critics have argued that more stringent governmental regulation
of the software market is necessary to ensure that anticompetitive
practices aren't used to create dangerous homogenous markets.7 9
They have urged that Microsoft be forced to publish the
communication interfaces that its applications use, or perhaps support
its applications on other operating systems to avoid tying users to the
Windows operating system.' 8° Although the consent decree between
the federal government and Microsoft resulting from latest antitrust
case supposedly addressed these issues, critics claim the settlement is
riddled with loopholes that allow Microsoft to continue its anti-
competitive practices. 1' The agreement did call for Microsoft to
disclose application programming interfaces (APIs) to competitors in
order to allow them to create products that can better inter-operate
with the Windows operating system."s However, the settlement also
allowed Microsoft to refuse to do so if the competitor did not meet
certain standards set by Microsoft.83 The agreement also only
required Microsoft to disclose to competitors whose software sold
over one million units in the previous year, essentially giving
Microsoft complete discretion when dealing with smaller startup
companies.14  Although the settlement was challenged by several
states and trade organizations as not being stringent enough, it was
eventually approved."
178. See id. (noting that as a result of this monoculture, "when a flaw is discovered in
the Windows operating system or one of its components it provides a very 'target rich'
environment for malicious attacks or viruses and worms to spread rapidly"); Cascio, supra
note 176 (detailing how the Melissa computer virus exploited the Microsoft monoculture
to spread widely across the internet).
179. Geer et al., supra note 163, at 18-19.
180. Id.





185. See Joe Wilcox, Judge OKs Most of Microsoft Settlement, Nov. 1, 2002, at
http://news.com.com/Judge+OKs+most+of+Microsoft+settlement/2100-1001_3-
964278.html; Ina Fried, Court Upholds Microsoft-Justice Dept. Settlement (June 30, 2004),
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How to best handle the potentially anti-competitive practices of
Microsoft is an incredibly complicated issue which is beyond the
scope of this note. However, the effect that these practices have on
computer security is relevant to considering how best to approach the
spyware epidemic. As discussed earlier in this note, preventative
technological solutions will provide the best protection to end users
against spyware, as detecting and removing spyware after infection
can be extremely difficult, and catching and prosecuting spyware
authors can be equally challenging. In order to encourage
competition and innovation in the security software industry, and
address the adverse affects that anti-competitive practices in the
operating system market have had on security quality, large operating
system vendors should be forced to license, under appropriate
confidentiality provisions, all relevant source code to security
software firms of all sizes. This policy would have the effect of
leveling the playing field between small firms that may not currently
be entitled to view Microsoft's source code under the latest consent
decree, and larger firms that can, encouraging smaller start-up
companies to compete with large security software vendors. It would
also greatly increase the quality and quantity of security solutions
available to end users. It would also act to counter the effects of the
allegedly anti-competitive practices discussed above, allowing security
software vendors a full understanding of the underlying complexities
of operating systems products, and the ability to develop security
solutions that address any flaws or problems related to anti-
competitive design. This policy seems even more sensible considering
that Microsoft is planning to offer its own anti-virus and anti-spyware
security software.186  There have already been allegations that
Microsoft's entrance into the security software market is just another
attempt by the company to use its operating system market share to
exert dominance in other parallel markets.1 This policy should apply
not only to Microsoft, but also to any other proprietary operating
system vendor that gains a threshold amount of market share in the
end-user install base. Such a policy would promote competition for
security products on every major operating system commercially
available, ensuring that no users are left out in the cold. Although
providing tough legislation to combat deceptive spyware installation
techniques is a step in the right direction, forcing operating systems




vendors to license source code to security software firms would
encourage development of software solutions that prevent spyware
infection from happening in the first place. Given the difficulty of
diagnosing and fixing an infected computer system, this solution
seems far more valuable to end users than an effective legal remedy.
V. Conclusion
Spyware is a growing security and privacy problem that is
directly related to other computer security phenomenon such as
computer worms and viruses. Current state and federal anti-spyware
legislation is primarily designed to address surreptitious installation
methods employed by the adware industry. The federal Spy Act does
not effectively protect users from these adware industry practices. By
requiring infringing acts to be deceptive, providing too weak of a
notice and consent provision, and limiting enforcement to the FTC,
experts predict that the act will do little to stop the adware industry
from using misleading techniques to manipulate users into installing
and running adware applications. Utah's Spyware Control Act of
2004 was viewed as an effective means of preventing these threats.
By enforcing a strict and intricate notice and consent provision,
creating a private cause of action, and allowing hefty damages, the act
provided a strong incentive to a large group of potential victims to
pursue violators. Altering the Spy Act to more closely mirror the
Utah Spyware Control Act of 2004, incorporating any relevant
changes suggested by WhenU's constitutional challenge of the law,
would impose a strict federal standard on the adware industry
enforceable by the same private actors and groups.
But having tough anti-adware legislation does little to protect
computer users from malicious spyware programs that are delivered
by computer worms, viruses, and trojan programs. Although several
federal laws already classify these acts illegal, enforcing those laws on
a global internet is incredibly challenging, and offers users very little
preventative protection against dangerous security threats. Imposing
governmental regulation that forces operating systems vendors to
disclose all relevant source code to security software firms would
encourage competition and innovation in the computer security
industry, greatly increasing the quality and quantity of preventative
security solutions available to end users. Given the difficulty and cost
of diagnosing and fixing a computer system infected with spyware,
preventative technological solutions seem far more valuable to end
users than effective legal remedies against spyware authors.
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